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Chevron Deference: An Empirical Review of 




During the trial which culminated in his death sentence, 
Socrates argued “the unexamined life is not worth living.”1 Perhaps 
a parallel wisdom can be derived for judicial realms—perhaps an 
unexamined legal doctrine is not worth applying. Just as our vast 
body of law has continually transmogrified over time, it may be that 
our legal doctrines should be constantly reassessed and adjusted 
when and where appropriate. Chevron deference is one such 
doctrine worthy of re-evaluation. 
The literature is replete with academic examinations of both 
Chevron’s supposed wisdom and folly.2 But such speculations 
remain simply that: academic. Without actual, empirical 
evidence of how the doctrine is being applied by the courts, it is 
impossible to know if arguments on either side have been 
persuasive to the judges daily called upon to decide when and 
how to apply Chevron deference in a case at hand. Having 
reviewed and appreciated the several empirical studies 
conducted in this area, this Article seeks to expand the 
investigation and presents similar findings with respect to 
Chevron deference application at the federal district courts—an 
unexamined judicial level until this study. This Article takes a 
slightly different approach than previous studies as it attempts 
 
  J.D. 2020, Chapman University Dale E. Fowler School of Law. My deepest 
appreciation goes out to my faculty advisors, Professor Anthony Caso and Professor John 
Eastman, for their dedication to the Constitutional Jurisprudence Clinic at the Fowler 
School of Law. This Article is a by-product of the Clinic as the idea for the research 
germinated while drafting several amicus curiae briefs on Chevron-related issues during 
my work in the Clinic. I am sincerely grateful for their support and encouragement. 
Additionally, I wish to thank my sons, Austin, Zac, and Darren, for their continued 
support, as well as my husband Rev. Dr. Robb C. Ring. 
 1 Socrates, Apology, in ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY 88, 102 (Forrest E. Baird & Walter 
Kaufman eds., 2003). 
 2 Throughout this Article, the doctrine of Chevron deference will be repeatedly 
referred to simply by the moniker “Chevron.” The underlying case is at times referred to 
as “Chevron USA.” 
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to examine the rigor with which the courts apply the deference 
doctrine—not simply whether the agency prevails under the 
application. 
A brief account of Chevron’s emergence and rise first serves 
to ground the reader in particulars of the doctrine under 
scrutiny, including several Athena-istic deference doctrines that 
subsequently sprung forth fully-formed from the Zeus-like 
Chevron head. Part II recounts various prior empirical studies of 
court applications and overlays the accumulated results on 
current data to underline the need for a district court level 
examination. Part III describes the current study, both in 
methodology and result, and finds that at the district court level 
there is ample room for improvement in the rigor applied to a 
Chevron analysis. Part IV summarizes the research and offers 
further possible inquiries in this realm that would serve to 
augment not only this current undertaking, but the body of 
empirical Chevron studies in general. 
A. Chevron’s Appearance 
Chevron deference entered the scene via Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. 
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., a decision penned by Justice 
Stevens in June 1984.3 The case dealt with interpretations of EPA 
emissions standards and whether the standards should be construed 
narrowly, to every individual building within a refinery complex, or 
broadly, such that the emissions should be measured across the 
entire complex as a whole.4 Thomas Merrill summed it up well in his 
2014 article, The Story of Chevron: The Making of an Accidental 
Landmark, when he wrote, “Most landmark decisions are born 
great—they are understood to be of special significance from the 
moment they are decided. But Chevron was little noticed when it was 
decided, and came to be regarded as a landmark case only some years 
later.”5 This Supreme Court decision, introduced without great 
fanfare or full understanding of its future application, indeed came 
through the Court quietly without ruffling any feathers or creating 
much stir, even in academia. In the year following its publication, 
twenty-six law review articles cited the Chevron case.  
 
 3 467 U.S. 837. 
 4 Id. at 840. 
 5 Thomas W. Merrill, The Story of Chevron: The Making of an Accidental 
Landmark, 66 ADMIN. L. REV. 253, 257 (2014). See also FedSoc Films, Chevron: 
Accidental Landmark, FEDERALIST SOC’Y (Dec. 19, 2018), 
http://fedsoc.org/commentary/videos/chevron-accidental-landmark [http://perma.cc/B68U- 
MNVQ] (discussing the origins of the Chevron doctrine and how it rose to become an 
“accidental landmark”). 
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Of these, seventeen referred to the holding only in footnotes,6 four 
gave it a passing mention,7 and one simply compared it to prior court 
findings.8 The six remaining articles voiced cautious opinions, hedged 
with words such as “may,” “perhaps,” “if,” and “suggests.”9 
Nonetheless, the Chevron decision has left a deep and lasting 
impression known as Chevron deference—today a well-established 
and widely relied upon doctrine.10 
Chevron deference, according to the Court, is a two-step 
process for judicial review of statutory interpretation by a federal 
agency, where the agency is acting within a specified 
congressional delegation.11 In Step One, a court determines if 
“Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue” in 
its authorization of the agency to promulgate the statute.12 If 
Congress has been clear, “that is the end of the matter” as “the 
court . . . must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent 
of Congress.”13 This investigation of meaning is to be done by 
“employing traditional tools of statutory construction.”14 If 
ambiguity is found, deference is given to an agency’s reasonable 
interpretation at Step Two.15 The interpretation need not be the 
best possible reading, or even one well-thought out in light of the 
statute’s surrounding wording or legislative purpose, it need only 
be reasonable. This deference doctrine has come to be called an 
“icon of administrative law.”16 
 
 6 See, e.g., Michael Asimow, Nonlegislative Rulemaking and Regulatory Reform, 
1985 DUKE L.J. 381, 385 n.27 (1985); Colin S. Diver, Statutory Interpretation in the 
Administrative State, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 549, 596 n.250 (1985). 
 7 See, e.g., Michael Fix & George C. Eads, The Prospects for Regulatory Reform: The 
Legacy of Reagan’s First Term, 2 YALE J. ON REGUL. 293, 306–07 (1985); Andrew Joseph 
Siegel, The U.S.-Japanese Whaling Accord: A Result of the Discretionary Loophole in the 
Packwood-Magnuson Amendment, 19 GEO. WASH. J. INT’L L. & ECON. 577, 600 (1985). 
 8 Merrick B. Garland, Deregulation and Judicial Review, 98 HARV. L. REV. 505, 
549–53 (1985). 
 9 See, e.g., Stephen M. Lynch, A Framework for Judicial Review of an Agency’s 
Statutory Interpretation: Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 
1985 DUKE L.J. 469, 470 (1985) (“In Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense 
Council, the Supreme Court may have forged the analytic framework for assessing the 
validity of an administrative agency’s construction of the statute that it is charged with 
administering.”); Eric Redman, Statutory Construction in the Supreme Court: A Northwest 
Power Act Example, 15 ENV’T. L. 353, 354 (1985) (“Thus, Chevron is perhaps more likely 
than ALCOA to have a lasting impact . . . .”). 
 10 See Kristin E. Hickman, The Need for Mead: Rejecting Tax Exceptionalism in 
Judicial Deference, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1537, 1579 (2006). 
 11 The requirement that the agency’s actions fall within a scope delineated by 
Congress is sometimes referred to as Chevron Step Zero. 
 12 Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984). 
 13 Id. at 842–43. 
 14 Id. at 843 n.9. 
 15 Id. at 842–44. 
 16 Jonathan R. Siegel, The Constitutional Case for Chevron Deference, 71 VAND. L. 
REV. 937, 938 (2018). 
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B. Chevron’s Expansion 
The distribution of Chevron references, as documented in 
Westlaw, is instructive. Figure 1 below summarizes the number 
of Chevron USA citations, across all jurisdictions, for each year 
from 1984 through 2019. 
Figure 1 
It is clear from the trend lines on the graph above that a steep 
rate of increase in citation occurred between 1984 and 1992.17 
Between 1993 and 2004, the same rise was present, but less 
pronounced. In 2005, a 38% jump in usage occurred—mostly 
reflected at the district court level which experienced a 92% 
increase from 2004 to 2005. The overall usage trend since 2005 has 
been decreasing. However, the decrease has yet to reach pre-1992 
levels.18 
C. Chevron’s Offspring 
The invention of Chevron deference opened the door to later 
forms of deference. The ensuing deference forms, previously thought 
unimaginable, each stood on Chevron—pushing the deference 
envelope a bit further. For example, if Chief Justice John Marshall 
had ruled on the meaning of a particular statute, and then was told 
 
 17 It is noted that the graphic in Figure 1 reflects Chevron USA citations only, not 
applications of the Chevron deference two-step test itself. 
 18 Again, this graphic reflects citations, not deference application. The trends for the 
data set studied herein are similar. It is hypothesized that the decreasing post-2005 trend 
is due in part to a corresponding increase in application of Chevron deference under 
varying pseudonyms. 
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that nonetheless, he must defer to a subsequent contrary 
interpretation of that statute, chances are he would have been 
greatly amused, assumed such a claim was a joke, and reminded us 
all of the emphatic duty of the judiciary “to say what the law is.”19 
But it is this exact situation, among others, that the Chevron 
deference offspring have created. Under Brand X deference, an 
agency’s interpretation of an ambiguous statute prevails over a 
court’s prior contrary interpretation.20 In this same vein, agency 
deference is given when ambiguity exists in the meaning of an 
agency’s own regulations under Auer deference.21 That is, the 
agency solely holds the power to both write and interpret 
regulations, directly contrary to a constitutional system which 
emphasizes separation of powers. In City of Arlington v. FCC, the 
Court extended Chevron deference to questions of agency 
jurisdiction, holding that, when a statute is ambiguous on whether 
the relevant agency has authority to interpret it, courts must defer 
to the agency’s determination that it has such authority.22 
D. Recent Rumblings in the Court 
The discussion surrounding the prudence of Chevron 
deference application has been ongoing for several years, if not 
decades. And, in a sort of parallel percolation among academia, 
the discussion appears to have risen to a sufficient level to catch 
the eye of the Supreme Court. The current conservative makeup 
of the Court has helped ripen such notice into comment. 
In the Court’s 2019 Kisor v. Wilkie decision, the Court 
addressed Auer deference—one of the aforementioned kin of 
Chevron.23 The Court in Kisor encouraged a “cabined” approach 
to judicial acquiescence, warning that “deference is not the 
answer to every question of interpreting an agency’s rules.”24 
This warning by the Court should trigger careful investigation 
into all judicial deference. 
The Court instructed in Kisor that “[f]irst and foremost,” 
deference should only be granted when “the regulation is 
genuinely ambiguous.”25 And before determining genuine 
ambiguity exists, courts “must exhaust all the ‘traditional tools’ 
of construction.”26 Accordingly, under Kisor, all tools of statutory 
 
 19 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803). 
 20 Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 982–83 (2005). 
 21 Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 462–63 (1997). 
 22 569 U.S. 290, 296–97 (2013). 
 23 139 S.Ct. 2400, 2408 (2019) (addressing the scope of Auer deference). 
 24 Id. at 2408, 2414. 
 25 Id. at 2415. 
 26 Id. 
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interpretation must be utilized when courts attempt to discern 
the meaning of an agency’s regulation. The Court thus narrowed 
the scope of Auer deference by instructing that courts “must 
‘carefully consider[]’ the text, structure, history, and purpose” of 
an agency’s regulations since “[d]oing so will resolve many 
seeming ambiguities out of the box . . . .”27 This “all tools 
exhausted” standard is not a novel concept.28 The Court’s call for 
such a standard is appropriately extended to Chevron deference 
as well,29 especially since it is reflected in the original wording of 
the Chevron USA decision itself.30 
II. PREVIOUS STUDIES 
Chevron deference has been in place for just over thirty-five 
years and the underlying case has been cited in over 17,000 
decisions subsequently, according to the Westlaw database.31 
Figure 2 below depicts the yearly distribution of Chevron case 
citations for the main three federal court levels. A complete 
evaluation of how and when Chevron deference has been applied 
to these thousands of cases would be daunting, to say the least. 
 
 27 Id. 
 28 See, e.g., Aqua Prods., Inc. v. Matal, 872 F.3d 1290, 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“In 
considering [the statutory] language, we must assure ourselves that we have employed all 
‘traditional tools of statutory construction’ . . . .”) (citation omitted); Delek Refin. v. 
Occupational Safety & Health Rev. Comm’n, 845 F.3d 170, 175 (5th Cir. 2016) (“We will 
consider all the ‘traditional tools of statutory construction’ before concluding that a 
statute is ambiguous.”) (citation omitted); Adams v. Holder, 692 F.3d 91, 95 (2d Cir. 2012) 
(noting Chevron Step Two is only examined if “the statute remains ambiguous despite our 
use of all relevant tools of statutory construction . . . .”); Krzalic v. Republic Title Co., 314 
F.3d 875, 880 (7th Cir. 2002) (“[C]ourts do not consider themselves bound by ‘plain 
meaning,’ but have recourse to other interpretive tools in an effort to make sense of the 
statute.”) (citations omitted); Loving v. I.R.S., 742 F.3d 1013, 1016 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (“In 
determining whether a statute is ambiguous and in ultimately determining whether the 
agency’s interpretation is permissible or instead is foreclosed by the statute, we must 
employ all the tools of statutory interpretation, including ‘text, structure, purpose, and 
legislative history.’”) (citations omitted). 
 29 See also Matthews v. Barr, 927 F.3d 606, 615 (2d Cir. 2019) (“[T]he Supreme 
Court’s [Esquivel-Quintana] decision reminds courts to use all available tools of statutory 
construction . . . before concluding that a statutory term is ambiguous . . . .”); King v. 
Burwell, 759 F.3d 358, 367 (4th Cir. 2014) (noting “[c]ourts should employ all the 
traditional tools of statutory construction” at Chevron Step One); Strickland v. Comm’r, 
Me. Dept. of Hum. Servs., 48 F.3d 12, 17 (1st Cir. 1995) (“[I]t is appropriate to employ all 
the ‘traditional tools of statutory construction’ in the first part of the Chevron analysis 
when the statutory language itself is not dispositive.”) (citations omitted). 
 30 See, e.g., TransAm Trucking, Inc. v. Admin. Rev. Bd., U.S. Dep’t of Lab., 833 F.3d 
1206, 1216 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (then-Judge Gorsuch reminding the 
bench that simple use of a dictionary can resolve ambiguity); Kent Barnett & Christopher 
J. Walker, Chevron in the Circuit Courts, 116 MICH. L. REV. 1, 71–72 (2017) (summarizing 
case opinions at the court of appeals level from 2003–2013 and finding “circuit-by-circuit 
disparity in . . . invocation of Chevron”); Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 
Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.9 (1984). 
 31 As of April 23, 2021, there were exactly 17,348 cases. 
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Various empirical studies of Chevron deference have been 
conducted in the past, but due to the extremely large data set 
encountered, each study has chosen a particular focus to produce 
a manageable subset. Generally, these studies have focused on 




A. Supreme Court Studies 
The most noteworthy Supreme Court study was done by 
Eskridge and Baer in 2008.32 The study examined Supreme 
Court decisions between 1984 and 2005 in which an agency 
interpretation of a statute was at issue.33 This criterion produced 
a set of 1014 cases which were coded for 156 variables ranging 
from basic descriptive information of the key statute to the voting 
record for each judge.34 Based on this, Eskridge and Baer 
developed a “Continuum of Deference” across Supreme Court 
decisions and showed that when Chevron deference was applied, 
the agency win rate was 76.2%.35 However, they also concluded 
that, as of 2005, “there has not been a Chevron ‘revolution’ at the 
Supreme Court level” as Chevron deference had only been 
 
 32 William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme 
Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. 
L.J. 1083 (2008). 
 33 Id. at 1094. 
 34 Id. 
 35 Id. at 1100. 
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applied 8.3% of the time in Supreme Court cases involving 
statutory interpretation.36 
In an earlier study, Thomas Merrill found it to be “clear that 
Chevron is often ignored by the Supreme Court. . . . [as] the two-step 
framework has been used . . . only about one-third of the [time].”37 
Merrill’s study compared Supreme Court agency win rates for the 
three years before Chevron to those in the six years after the Chevron 
decision was handed down.38 
B. Appellate Courts Studies 
An outstanding 2017 empirical study by Barnett and Walker 
examined circuit court opinions from 2003 to 2013 and found 
inconsistencies in the circuit courts’ application of Chevron in 
general.39 Starting with a data set of 2,272 cases, the study culled 
the decisions pulled down to 1,327 relevant opinions.40 Reviewing 
these relevant opinions, they discovered circuits differed 
significantly in agency-win rates when Chevron was applied, from 
88.2% in the Sixth Circuit, to 72.3% in the Ninth Circuit.41 That is, 
Barnett and Walker observed that some circuits are simply more 
deferential. The study concluded: “The circuit-by-circuit disparity in 
the circuit courts’ invocation of Chevron and agency-win rates 
reveals that Chevron may not be operating uniformly among the 
circuits.”42 
Other studies examining circuit court applications have been 
done by Kerr43 as well as Schuck and Elliott.44 Kerr looked at 
circuit court opinions in 1995–96,45 whereas Schuck and Elliot 
focused on D.C. Circuit application for select periods (“1965, 
1975, 1984–85, and 1988”).46 
C. Subject-Specific Studies 
Some studies only reviewed topic-specific cases. For example, 
Miles and Sunstein looked at appellate court decisions from 1990 
 
 36 Id. at 1090. 
 37 Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE L.J. 969, 
982 (1992). 
 38 Id. at 980–82. 
 39 Barnett & Walker, supra note 30, at 1. 
 40 Id. at 5. 
 41 Id. at 49. 
 42 Id. at 71–72. 
 43 Orin S. Kerr, Shedding Light on Chevron: An Empirical Study of the Chevron 
Doctrine in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 15 Yale J. on Regul. 1 (1998). 
 44 Peter H. Schuck & E. Donald Elliott, To the Chevron Station: An Empirical Study 
of Federal Administrative Law, 1990 Duke L.J. 984 (1990). 
 45 Kerr, supra note 43 at 1. 
 46 Schuck & Elliott, supra note 44, at 988. 
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through 2004 that involved EPA and NLRB interpretations.47 
They also included a parallel examination of sixty-nine Supreme 
Court cases.48 In a study by Revesz, D.C. Circuit cases from 1970 
to 1994 were investigated for cases concerning health-and-safety 
decisions.49 Along this same line, a 2008 study by Czarnezki 
examined environmental law cases in circuit courts over the 
three-year period from 2003 to 2005.50 
D. Summary of Studies Over Time 
In Figure 3 below, the years examined by these past 
empirical studies have been overlaid on a graphical depiction of 
yearly Chevron USA citations for each judicial level, as originally 
shown in Figure 2. Red bars denote examined Supreme Court 
cases, dark pink bars indicate years where all circuit court cases 
were examined, and light pink bars show time frames during 
which a subset of all available cases were investigated. The 
individual studies themselves are reflected on Figure 3 as either 
solid lines (indicating all cases were examined), or as dashed 
lines (indicating a subset of cases were looked at). Figure 3 
highlights the lack of investigation done at the district court 
level, as well as the limits of studies done at the circuit court 
level. The study undertaken herein is depicted as a curved line of 
large dashes. 
 
 47 See Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, Do Judges Make Regulatory Policy? An 
Empirical Investigation of Chevron, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 823, 823 (2006) (examining only 
EPA and NLRB cases). 
 48 Id. at 825. 
 49 Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and the D.C. Circuit, 83 
VA. L. REV. 1717 (1997). 
 50 Jason J. Czarnezki, An Empirical Investigation of Judicial Decisionmaking, 
Statutory Interpretation, and the Chevron Doctrine in Environmental Law, 79 U. COLO. L. 
REV. 767, 767 (2008). 
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Figure 3 
III. CURRENT STUDY 
Upon reviewing the previous empirical studies of Chevron 
done to date, the paucity of insight into application at the initial 
federal level, i.e., in the district courts, became evident. It is 
naturally expected that the appellate court level addresses a 
mere fraction of the number of cases passing across the district 
court threshold.51 But for a true understanding of the doctrine’s 
day-in, day-out application, there is a prudence in examining the 
lowest federal judicial tier as well. The studies described in Part 
II cover approximately twenty-eight percent of the possible cases 
to investigate and, in some instances, overlap.52 Again, further 
empirical study of Chevron application seems timely and useful 
as the current Court make-up has signaled a willingness to 
wrestle with the underlying wisdom of the doctrine and its scope. 
 
 51 See, e.g., Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics 2019, U.S. CTS., 
http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/federal-judicial-caseload-statistics-2019 
[http://perma.cc/8EAU-UV6E]. 
 52 See Figure 3, supra Part II. Twenty-eight percent is derived by assuming the 
subject-specific studies constituted examination of half the available cases. In reality, this 
number is likely much lower, possibly rendering the percent of cases study to be as low as 
nineteen percent. 
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A. Methodology 
An examination of only federal district courts reduces the 
size of the data set to 7,123 cases. In this study, a catalogue of 
basic application of Chevron deference over a broad swath of 
cases is presented, rather than a more detailed study on a 
smaller case subset. 
1. Chevron Citation as Proxy 
It is not necessarily true that an opinion which cited to the 
underlaying Chevron USA case applied the doctrine of Chevron 
deference as well. That is, citation is not expected to be an 
accurate proxy for the two-step Chevron application. However, 
based on the overall findings in the Barnett and Walker study, it 
was estimated the proxy would be accurate approximately 55% to 
60% of the time.53 
2. Quasi-random Case Selection 
Knowing that not all cases selected would apply the Chevron 
two-step analysis, this study set out to examine 500 cases, 
expecting an ultimate yield of about 275 cases of interest. 
Because many of the previous studies were conducted at the 
circuit court level, the district courts were first divided into 
subsets corresponding with their respective circuit. The circuit 
subsets were then divided according to the Westlaw “Depth of 
Treatment” designation.54 This was done to capture a 
representative number of cases across all levels of discussion.55 
Next, the cases were divided by decade, as reflected in Table 1 
below. Using the distribution in Table 1, the 500 cases were 
spread out proportionally over the circuit-depth-decade 
subcategories. Because cases must be chosen as whole numbers, 
numbers were rounded up where appropriate, and 511 total cases 
were selected. The individual cases within each subcategory were 
chosen randomly. 
 
 53 Barnett & Walker, supra note 30. 
 54 See Why you need KeyCite on Thomson Reuters, THOMSON REUTERS, 
http://legal.thomsonreuters.com/en/insights/articles/why-you-need-keycite. 
 55 That is, a case which applied Chevron deference in a few brief sentences would be 
captured along with cases where the application occupied the majority of the opinion. 
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Table 1 
3. Coding  
The basic identifying information (caption, citation, date, 
court, circuit, etc.) was entered and tracked in an Excel 
spreadsheet. Additional variables were entered as each case was 
examined. These variables included depth of treatment, 
subsequent treatment by the courts of appeals, document type, 
case disposition, as well as a count of the number of times the 
Chevron USA citation occurred. Each case was examined to see if 
a Chevron two-step analysis had been applied. If so, the level of 
rigor the court applied at each step was recorded using the 
following legend: 
0 = no discussion 
1 = passing mention 
2 = limited discussion 
3 = full discussion 
This numerical coding allowed the entire dataset to be easily 
examined and the results to be represented graphically for 
additional clarity. 
B. Results 
The convenient coding of results in this study via Excel 
spreadsheet enabled the creation of simple graphical illustrations 
of the data, as seen throughout the following sections.56 The use 
of this format also allowed data to be easily separated into 
relevant subsets and corresponding graphs for comparison 
purposes. 
 
 56 Complete spreadsheet and corresponding graphs are available from the author 
upon request. 
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1. Frequency of Application 
Out of the 511 cases reviewed, a Chevron analysis was found 
to be applied in 252 rulings. This means that for the cases 
randomly selected for this study, fifty-one percent contained one 
or more references to the underlying Chevron USA opinion but 
did not apply the two-step analysis laid out therein. This 
percentage is higher than that reflected in the Barnett and 
Walker study, but judicial level may account for the difference.57 
This means citation to the Chevron USA case was only an 
accurate proxy for application of the Chevron deference doctrine 
approximately half of the time—a key factor to be considered in 
formulating methodology for future studies. It is not surprising 
that the average number of Chevron citations in cases applying 
the deference doctrine was greater than those in the compliment 
set.58 Interestingly, for the cases applying Chevron, twenty-seven 
percent cited to the Chevron USA opinion only once.59 
2. Frequency of Deference 
This study revealed overall that the district courts grant 
deference to agency interpretations with high frequency. 
Specifically, the courts found the underlying statute to be 
unambiguous twenty-seven percent of the time at Step One of the 
Chevron analysis.60 In these cases, Step Two was generally not 
considered.61 For the remaining cases where the statute was found 
to be ambiguous at Step One, the court deferred to the agency 
interpretation at a much higher rate than not. Of all cases where 
the deference doctrine was applied, the Step Two analysis found 
the agency interpretation to be unreasonable only nine percent of 
the time.62 The level of analytical rigor applied by the courts in 
coming to these decisions, however, was not constant across the 
board and is addressed in the following step-specific sections. 
It is noted that in a circuit level review of the data in this 
study, the district courts in the D.C. Circuit are most likely to 
apply a Chevron analysis (68% application), followed by those in 
the Tenth Circuit (66% application). The Eighth and Ninth 
 
 57 Barnett & Walker, supra note 30, at 27 (finding 1,327 relevant cases among 2,272 
cases studied, a 58.4% rate of application). 
 58 In cases applying Chevron, the average number of citations was 5 (with a maximum of 
139). For cases in which the Chevron USA case was cited but the doctrine was not applied, the 
average citation count was 2 (with a maximum value of 39). 
 59 See Figure 4. 
 60 Id. 
 61 In seven percent of the cases, the court went on to evaluate Step Two as well. 
 62 See Figure 4. 
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Circuits are closely tied behind (55% and 56% application, 
respectively). 
Figure 4 
3. Step One Analysis 
When the two-step Chevron deference doctrine is applied, Step 
One is applied with varying amounts of rigor. Overall, a full 
examination of the text to determine the existence of ambiguity was 
performed 38.1% of the time, as depicted in Figure 5 below. 
However, this number is somewhat misleading as it reflects the 
data as whole. Breaking down the cases into sub-categories 
reflecting the outcome of the Step One analysis (i.e., ambiguous or 
unambiguous), it was found that a full analysis is applied 50% of 
the time in unambiguous findings, but much less—only 33.7% of the 
time—when ambiguity is discovered. Figure 6 reflects the complete 
range of levels of discussion in these two sub-categories. It is noted 
that, in Figure 6, a “passing mention” level of analysis when a 
statute was found unambiguous was usually a simple cite to prior 
or sister court precedent. 
The discrepancy in application of a “full discussion” level of 
analysis between ambiguous and unambiguous findings, as reflected 
in Figure 6, begs the question of whether this result is a cause or an 
effect. That is, do courts include a deeper, more robust discussion 
when they are seeking to justify a finding of unambiguity? Or does a 
deeper, more robust discussion more frequently lead to a finding of 
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unambiguity? Absent insight into the minds of the individual judges 
behind these opinions, this query cannot be answered from the data 





Overall, the levels of discussion at Step One in Figure 5 across 
the sampling of district court cases in this study, at first glance, 
seem heartening. Taken together, a limited or full discussion was 
applied in 57.5% of the cases.63 This number would appear to 
 
 63 See Figure 5. 
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bolster claims that the district courts are dutiful in applying 
appropriate rigor at Step One. However, it is disturbing to see that 
29.4% of the time, the courts give Step One analysis no more than a 
passing mention.64 It is even more disturbing that in 13.1% of cases, 
no discussion of Step One was included in a Chevron analysis.65 
These numbers underline the need seen by the Supreme Court in 
Kisor to emphasize the requirement to exhaust all the traditional 
tools of construction in determining if genuine ambiguity exists—a 
standard the district courts are failing to faithfully meet. 
4. Step Two Analysis 
Having determined there is an ambiguity present, the courts 
next consider at Step Two whether the agency’s interpretation was 
reasonable. As seen in Figure 7, this study found a full discussion 
of the question was afforded 44.6% of the time across the board. 
But again, a discrepancy is seen when the data is sub-divided by 
result, i.e., by whether or not deference is ultimately given to the 
agency interpretation.66 
Much like the question posed in the Step One results above, 
there is a question of cause and effect presented in the Step Two 
results. Remembering that weighted percentages must be applied 
to the graphs in Figure 8 in order to produce the graph in Figure 
7, it is somewhat striking to see that a full discussion occurs 
56.5% of the time when no deference is given, as opposed to only 
in 42.9% of the cases where deference is granted. Is the higher 
percent of full discussion given as a justification for finding no 
deference is warranted? Or is a higher level of discussion more 
likely to lead to a denial of deference? These cause-and-effect 
questions were not anticipated at the outset of this study, and 
therefore, the study did not collect variables sufficient to address 
such inquiries. 
 
 64 Id. 
 65 Id. 
 66 See Figure 8. 
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Figure 7 
Figure 8 
Again, it is initially encouraging to see the relatively high 
frequency of full discussion reflected in Figure 7. Nonetheless, it 
seems counterintuitive that a Step Two analysis would ever be given 
no discussion or a simple passing mention, much less that such 
would occur 37.5% of the time.67 The district courts clearly have 
ample room for improvement in this area. 
 
 67 3.3% (no discussion) + 34.2% (passing mention) = 37.5%. 
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5. Circuit Comparisons 
The results presented above can also be viewed on a  
circuit-by-circuit basis since each district court decision in the 
study was coded to identify its parent circuit. This introduces a 
refinement to the levels of discussion given for Steps One and 
Two above. In Figures 9 and 10 below, each circuit is presented 
as a bar with the varying levels of discussion reflected in the 
same colors used in Figures 5 through 8 above. Each bar reflects 
100% of the data gathered at the circuit level and therefore, the 
colors reflect the percentage of application at each level, not 
actual numbers of cases in each category. According to Figure 9, 
the Eleventh Circuit applies a full discussion at Step One most 
often, followed closely by the Ninth Circuit and the D.C. Circuit. 
The Eleventh Circuit result, however, may be tempered by the 
fact that the “limited discussion” category is not reflected at all, 
and may be further exacerbated by the small number of cases 
studied for the Eleventh Circuit (17 cases total, as compared to 
49 cases and 47 cases at the Ninth and D.C. Circuits, 
respectively). The Fifth Circuit, in contrast, seems to be most 
willingly to give no discussion or a passingly mention in a 
Chevron Step One analysis. 
Figure 9 
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At Step Two, reflected in Figure 10 below, the First Circuit is 
most likely to apply a full discussion, followed by the D.C. Circuit 
and a tie between the Ninth and Tenth Circuits. But again, the 
percentages are impacted by the small sample size at the First 
Circuit level—only nine cases falling in the First Circuit were 
studied. 
Figure 10 
IV. CONCLUSION AND FURTHER POSSIBLE INQUIRIES 
This research seeks to fill an empirical study void by 
examining district court applications of the Chevron deference 
doctrine. The study found that for cases which apply the two-step 
analysis, the levels of rigor with which each step is applied varies 
significantly within the district courts themselves, from no 
discussion to full discussion, and equally varies among the 
respective circuit court groupings. Overall, there exists among 
the district courts a 38.1% full discussion application of Step 
One68 and a 44.6% full discussion application at Step Two.69 The 
failure of the courts to be more rigorous in Chevron application 
via full discussion suggests there may be merit to past academic 
 
 68 See Figure 5. 
 69 See Figure 7. 
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claims that the courts have wide room for improvement with 
respect to this doctrine.  
Such claims have not been limited to academia. In his 
dissent in TransAm Trucking, Inc. v. Administrative Review 
Board, United States Department of Labor, then-Judge Gorsuch 
pointedly reminded the court that “there are countless cases 
finding a statute unambiguous after examining the dictionary.”70 
Similarly, Justice Kavanaugh, while he was on the D.C. Circuit 
bench, observed variation in Chevron application among lower 
courts and noted that “judges’ personal views are infecting these 
kinds of cases” where judges “have wildly different conceptions of 
whether a particular statute is clear or ambiguous.”71 Indeed, 
this disparity in rigorous application has prompted the Court to 
warn that “a court cannot wave the ambiguity flag just because it 
found the regulation impenetrable on first read.”72 Justice Scalia 
has noted that sometimes “interpretation requires a taxing 
inquiry” and “Chevron is . . . not a declaration that, when 
statutory construction becomes difficult, we will throw up our 
hands and let regulatory agencies do it for us.”73 Although this 
“taxing inquiry” may not be omitted on account of its onerous 
nature, this study, alongside results from prior studies, suggests 
courts appear to be doing just that. 
In the future, the current study would be well served to be 
expanded to generate a greater sample size. Additionally, several 
supplementary lines of inquiry have been proposed above in Part III; 
although as presented, as cause versus effect inquiries, the study 
methodology would need to be significantly adjusted. Alternatively, 
updates of some of the prior studies presented in Part II would offer 
interesting insight, particularly on how the Chevron deference doctrine 
has weathered the last seven years at the circuit court level and the 
last fifteen years in the Supreme Court. Such expansions of the 
Barnett and Walker, and Eskridge and Baer studies, respectively, are 
still feasible at this point—albeit time-consuming—and the author 
strongly encourages the undertaking of these extensions to further 
general understanding of Chevron deference and how it has been and 
is currently being applied by the federal courts at all levels.74 
 
 70 833 F.3d 1206, 1216 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
 71 Brett M. Kavanaugh, Fixing Statutory Interpretation, 129 HARV. L. REV. 2118, 
2142, 2152 (2016). 
 72 Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S.Ct. 2400, 2415 (2019). 
 73 Pauley v. BethEnergy Mines, Inc., 501 U.S. 680, 707 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 74 In the author’s opinion, either update would be reasonable to accomplish with a 
suitable team of assistants. 
